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Spinoza for Our Time: Politics and Modernity  
Antonio Negri, William McCuaig (tr.) with a forward by Rocco Gangle  
New York, Columbia University Press, 2013, 125pp.,ISBN: 9780231160469  
While in prison, under the dubious accusation of being involved in terrorist activities, Negri 
did not waste his time or wallow in self-pity. He wrote The Savage Anomaly: The Power of 
Spinoza’s Metaphysics and Politics. This book, even though it was from Italy, could be said 
to be part of a veritable renaissance in Spinoza studies in France in the 1960s, as usefully 
explained in the introduction to this book, with works by such thinkers as Matheron, 
Althusser, Balibar, Macherey and Deleuze. Such a renewal in interest in Spinoza was quite 
different from the mainstream of Spinoza studies in England and America, associated with 
such names as Bennett, Hampshire and Curley, or even more contemporary writers like 
Nadler and Rocca, who rarely if ever quote or refer to this other tradition of interpreting 
Spinoza. Not only does Negri write of Spinoza as anomaly within philosophy, but his 
Spinoza is also one. The difference between these writers and the dominant interpretation is 
that they have a strong ontological reading of Spinoza, which they immediately tie into a 
discourse of political emancipation. This is in contrast to a more ‘contractual’ reading of 
Spinoza that inserts him within the ‘normal’ sequence of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. For 
this reason, Negri’s reading cannot be separated, and he has never concealed it, from his own 
political commitment to absolute democracy. Negri not only comes to Spinoza through Marx, 
but also through a long political struggle under the banner of Autonomia Operaia. It was not 
by chance, then, that Negri wrote his first book on Spinoza in prison.  
This book is a translation of Spinoza et Nous. Of course, in terms of selling books as 
commodities, the publisher has to say that it contains something new, but it does not really. 
Where it is useful, is that in the first essay at least, ‘Spinoza: A Heresy of Immanence and of 
Democracy’, it offers a good summary of Negri’s interpretation of Spinoza, and from there, if 
the reader is convinced, or at least interested, they might go back to his more substantial 
work. I am less persuaded by the other essays in this small collection. Either because Negri’s 
reading is so peculiar (I have never found him very convincing on Heidegger, as in 
comparison, for example, with his contemporary Paolo Virno), or very slight (some of these 
essays are conference papers, which I do not believe always deserve or require publication, 
unless they have been substantially rewritten).  
At the heart of Negri’s reading of Spinoza is a strong interpretation of his ontology. 
Fundamental to Spinoza’s metaphysics is the relation between substance, attributes and 
modes. Each singular being is an expression of a common totality. Equally one can turn this 
expression around: the common totality is nothing but the expression of each singularity. The 
multiple and the one are not opposed to one another, as though the one were separate from 
the multiple, but the one is nothing but the individual expression of the multiple. At the heart 
of Spinoza’s metaphysics, therefore, and Negri stresses this again and again, is a rejection of 
any transcendence. There is nothing outside the multiple. God, for Spinoza is not a being that 
stands outside of creation, but is creation, Deus sive natura. The originality of Negri’s 
interpretation is to make us see that this ontology has direct political consequences. As he 
already insisted in The Savage Anomaly, Spinoza’s interruption of the Ethics to write the 
Political Treatise is not merely a response to the external events of the political upheaval in 
the United Provinces (modern day Netherlands) in the seventeenth century (Spinoza was an 
admirer of the Liberal Republicans under Johan de Witt), but follows directly from his own 
metaphysics. The rejection of transcendence at the ontological level parallels its refusal at the 
political level. If Spinoza argues for absolute democracy in the Political Treatise, Democratia 
omnio absoluta, then this is a reflection of his own ontology. Democracy is the mirror image 
of an immanent ontology.  
This absolute democracy, however, is not the same as a representative democracy, which 
emerges out of the social contract tradition. Here the power of the multitude (which is the 
political form of the ontological multiple) is to be feared and not admired. The aim of any 
representative democracy is to negate the many, and not to empower them, through passive 
affects (the politics of fear and false hopes). In our own time, our democracies have been 
neutered by the spectacle of consumption and false freedoms, where the ontological 
dimension is occluded. Democracy has become synonymous with representation (and this is a 
truism of our age, no-one can imagine democracy otherwise). This is why for Negri Spinoza 
is still important to us, not as an historical curiosity argued about in political theory and 
philosophy departments in our universities, but as directly applicable to our age and our 
problems, where there is a widespread feeling, which is manifest in the falling voting share in 
most advanced Western democracies, that our democracy is not really ours at all, but has 
been co-opted by a political elite in hock to multinational corporations.  
What is of particular importance to note in Spinoza’s ontology is that it is an ontology not of 
representation but of power. Being is power. Being is not a being which represents power but 
the degree of power of every individual being, which Spinoza calls conatus. Each individual 
being, in its own way, is the expression of the infinite power of being as such. This is, Negri 
writes, Spinoza’s materialism. It is not the reductive materialism of a crude scientism, or the 
absurd mythical teleology of so called dialectical materialism, which is a travesty of Marx’s 
thought, but an immanent ontology of power.  
The multitude, which is the subject of the third essay of this collection, ‘Multitude and 
Singularity in the Development of Spinoza’s Political Thought’, is nothing but the power of 
the individuals that make it up. It is the common. The function of representative democracy is 
to divide the multitudes against itself by introducing new forms of transcendence and 
division. This is the difference between potestas and potentia in Spinoza. Potestas is the 
power of authority, whereas potentia is actual force and strength of the multitude. In the 
society of the spectacle the real ontological relation is inverted, as though all power came 
from potestas and not potentia. Although on the surface, Spinoza’s political thought appears 
to be individualist, since each individual being seeks to preserve its own being, my being 
only increases its power through co-operation and community with others. It is not a 
community of the fusion of individuals, but a co-action. Spinoza’s political ontology moves 
from conatus, to cupiditas, and finally to amor. It is the opposite of a ‘possessive idealism’, 
which only sees in life the competitive struggle of all against all. Co-operation and 
productivity of individuals are what acts against exploitation. The common is not the 
transcendental unification of supposedly common interests, but the production of the 
common through individualities. It is the ‘coming together’ or ‘being-with’, where the 
individual is preserved rather than sublated in a higher unity.  
If Negri is right that Spinoza’s politics is an ontology through and through, then it should not 
surprise us that his interpretation would eventually come into collision with Heidegger. 
Already with this notion of the multitude as ‘being-with’, we hear echoes of Mitsein in Being 
and Time. Being with others is not something added onto my subjectivity but is fundamental 
to what it means to be me at all. The difference between them is Heidegger’s ontology is one 
of death, whereas Spinoza’s is one of life. ‘Potency and Ontology: Heidegger or Spinoza’, 
however, is a very slight essay in this collection (it was delivered as a paper in 2006 at 
conference in Berlin on Spinoza), so it can be difficult, through the polemic and name-
calling, to discern what Negri’s substantial critique of Heidegger’s ontology is. Here we 
would have to read his book Time for Revolution (which in reality is two books written at 
very different times). Negri accuses Heidegger of mysticism and an ontology of nothingness 
and death. Against this, we are to imagine Spinoza as the representative of rationality, 
fullness and life. Yet even Negri must admit, and does, that there is something much more 
interesting going on under this sloganeering. For he knows that Heidegger rediscovers the 
rich ontological reality of time against its reduction to quantity and space, and in this sense, 
as Negri outlines in the first part of Time and Revolution, his and Marx’s project are, in some 
ways, the same. Negri seems to want his cake and eat it. He wants to appear above the fray of 
political bickering (Heidegger is Nazi and so on, and we do not need to read him), while at 
the same time only begrudgingly accepting that Heidegger has anything at all in common 
with his own project, which means that he does not analyse in depth Heidegger’s own work 
(this is compounded perhaps by the form of this writing, as a conference paper, and so, at 
least in this form, cannot provide it).  
As a disparate collection of occasional writing, this small book has it strengths and 
weaknesses, as you might expect. The two chapters, ‘Spinoza: A heresy of immanence and of 
democracy’ and ‘Multitude and Singularity in the Development of Spinoza’s Thought’ are 
good introductions to Negri’s Spinoza. The other two chapters, the one on Heidegger, and the 
other, ‘Spinoza: A Sociology of the Affects’, are testimony to the fact that you should not 
always publish every paper you deliver at a conference (have those days gone when you 
would write just to speak and not to publish?). The latter, for example, is very slight indeed, 
and is largely made of long quotations from the Ethics. God knows what the audience made 
of it who had to listen to it, and I am not sure the reader will either.  
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